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Abstract
This paper analyzes the gender wage gaps across the wage distribution in both the private
and public sectors in Italy for the years 2005   2010. We use quantile regression methods
to estimate and decompose the gender wage gap at dierent points of the wage distribution.
We nd in both sectors a consistent level of gender wage gap (lower in the public sector)
and an increasing path along the wage distribution. Counterfactual decomposition analysis
supports the idea of a sticky oor mechanism in action in the private sector and of a glass
ceiling in the public sector. In addition to standard decomposition techniques we propose
a two step procedure that relies on a novel approach to estimating xed eects quantile
regressions. Its main advantage is that it allows the estimation of the marginal eect of the
employment sector on wages at dierent points of the distribution, while accounting for both
observable and time-invariant unobservable factors. When we control for employees' observed
and unobservable individual characteristics, the main nding is that the gender wage gap
substantially decreases in both sectors. A second evidence is that the sticky oor eect
in the private sector vanishes, while the glass ceiling eect in the public sector remains.
Correspondence to: University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management, Via San Felice 5, 27100
Pavia. E-mail: carolina.castagnetti@unipv.it
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The evidence from the longitudinal analysis amplies the dierences of the wage-setting
mechanisms in the two sectors.
Keywords: Gender wage gap, quantile regression for panel, public-private wage dierential
JEL - Classication: J3, J45
1 Introduction
Gender dierentials in the labor market have obtained much attention from policy makers and
researchers, leading to the implementation of equal-pay legislation and the promotion of equal
opportunities. Even though the latter policies have been promoted in Western industrialized
countries for several decades, dierences in pay between men and women persist. Yet, there are
tremendous dierences across countries, and a robust nding in the literature is that the dier-
ence in pay by gender cannot be entirely explained by dierences in human capital, job or rm
characteristics, and that the unexplained part of the gap is considerably large. Moreover, recent
researches have shown that the magnitude of the gender wage gap (GWG) varies substantially
across both the public and private sector and the wage distribution.
The theoretical interpretations of dierences in pay among sectors are several: for instance
Gregory and Borland (1999), among others, argue that these dierences in wage structure are
not surprising given that wage setting in the public sector occurs in a political environment
whereas private-sector decision making occurs in a market environment. It is entirely possible
that greater attention to bureaucratic procedures for wage setting and pay comparability in the
public sector can lead to better relative wage outcomes for females than in the private sector.
Moreover, anti-discrimination legislation may be more aggressively enforced in the public sector,
and there is some evidence that occupational integration has been more rapid in public-sector
employment. Public sector jobs also tend to be concentrated in larger establishments, in a
limited number of industries, and in specic occupations employing relatively educated workers.
Finally, public-sector employment may attract more risk-averse workers (Pfeifer, 2008).
The empirical evidence on how the relative wage of men and women varies across dierent
sectors has shown that the mean gender wage gap is typically considerably smaller in public-
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sector jobs (see Arulamplam, Booth, and Bryan (2007), Gregory and Borland (1999), Gunderson
(1989)) while the distribution of wages varies dramatically across sectors (see Arulamplam,
Booth, and Bryan (2007), Kee (2006)). However, the nding of a lower level of GWG in the
public sector is limited to developed economies only, as stressed by Lausev (2014) and Ganguli
and Terrell (2005).
Baron and Cobb-Clark (2010) investigate the GWG across public and private sector wage
distribution for the Australia. They nd that the gender wage gap among high-wage workers
is largely unexplained in both the private and the public sector while is more than explained
by dierences in individual characteristics among low-paid workers. This nding suggests that
glass ceilings rather than sticky oors may be prevalent in explaining the gender wage gap in
the dierent sectors. For glass ceilings and sticky oors we refer to the unexplained component
of the GWG widening at the top and at the bottom of the wage distribution, respectively.
The results of Baron and Cobb-Clark (2010) are conrmed by the analysis of Blau and Kahn
(2003). They nd that on average, discrimination on the basis of gender dierences, as well
as the dierential between male and female wage increase over the work life of an individual.
Further, the unexplained gender gap in the public sector increases along the wage distribution
and with respect to the private sector.
Arulamplam, Booth, and Bryan (2007) investigate GWG by sector for 11 European countries
and conclude that glass ceilings are more prevalent than sticky oors in most countries. They
show that the magnitude of the GWG varies substantially across the public and private sector
wage distributions. The main nding in Kee (2006) for Australia is that a strong glass ceiling
eect is detected only in the private sector. On the opposite, Wahlberg (2010) provides evidence
for the Swedish market of a glass ceiling eect in both the private and public sectors (particularly
evident in the public sector).
Miller (2009) extends the line of inquiry of Arulamplam, Booth, and Bryan (2007) and
Kee (2006) to the US labor market. The analysis shows that the GWG diers by sector of
employment and according to the part of the earnings distribution that is considered. The pay
dierential in the private sector in the US does not display either the glass ceiling or sticky oor
eects that have been reported for many other countries. The government sector is, however,
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characterized by a distinct sticky oor eect in the female-male pay dierential.
Zweimuuller and Winter-Ebmer (1994) draw attention to the role of dierent job levels
on the GWG in Austria. They identify discriminatory promotion scheme and show structural
dierences among the two sectors: women are overrepresented at the bottom of the job hierarchy
in the private sector, while they suer from a career stop from middle management positions
upwards in the public sector. Chatterjia, Mumfordb, and Smith (2011) investigate for Britain
the role of workplace characteristics in explaining the gender earnings gap in the public and
private sectors. Even the inclusion of detailed workplace characteristics explains little of the
GWG in both sectors.
Rahona-Lopez, Murillo-Huertas, and del Mar Salinas-Jimenez (2016) show a consistent level
of GWG in Spain and that the wage dierentials are signicantly greater in the private sector
across the entire wage distribution. Moreover while women posses better personal endowments
than men in the public sector, men have better personal endowments in the private sector. The
empirical evidence shows also that the GWG is more pronounced in the top of the earnings
distribution and the GWG cannot be explained by dierences in productive characteristics,
with dierences in returns accounting for 80% or more of the observed gap among the best paid
workers in the public and private sectors.
However, the results change when the analysis is pointed to transitioning countries of Eastern
Europe, for instance, as shown by Ganguli and Terrell (2005), Pignatti (2012) and Lausev
(2014). Ganguli and Terrell (2005) examine gender gaps across the distribution of wages in
Ukraine for the period Ukraine started to be considered a market economy. They nd evidence
in both sectors of a persistent glass ceiling but lower in the public than in the private sector.
By decomposing the GWG in their components, they nd dierences in men's and women's
(observed) productive characteristics that favor men in the public and women in the private
sector. However, they report substantial evidence in each year and in each sector that the most
important force driving the gender gaps throughout the distribution are dierential rewards,
or discrimination. They conrm the analysis of Pignatti (2012) of the eect of the gender-
equalizing policies on the reduction in the GWG, particularly at the bottom of the distribution.
Surprisingly, Ganguli and Terrell (2005) show that the GWG in the private sector is smaller
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than in the public sector in the top half of the distribution. This result has been conrmed by
Lausev (2014) who shows that the lower GWG in the public sector is limited only to developed
economies. Indeed, in the transitioning countries of Eastern Europe, for example, the GWG in
the public sector is wider than in the private sector.
The literature on the GWG in general identify the unexplained component of the GWG as
discrimination component. However, as stressed by Blau and Kahn (2006) among others, the
unexplained portion of the GWGmay include eects of unobserved productivity or compensating
dierentials.
The focus of this paper is the analysis of the GWG in Italy in both public and private sector
and the decomposition in its determinants. To this task we rely on the Machado and Mata (2005)
methodology to obtain counterfactual distributions of the wage gap. The Machado and Mata
(2005)'s procedure has been extensively applied in the context of the estimation of GWG, as, for
example, in Albrecht, Bjorklund, and Vroman (2003), Arulamplam, Booth, and Bryan (2007)
and Albrecht, van Vuurenc, and Vroman (2009). However, together with the Machado and Mata
(2005) approach we consider the unobserved individual-specic heterogeneity by means of the
quantile regression for panel data proposed by Canay (2011). In order to assess how the GWG
varies across the wage distribution we propose the following two step procedure for computing
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition; First, we estimate the GWG by means of Canay (2011)
approach and then we run the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition for quantile regression.
The main advantage of our method is that it allows the estimation of the marginal eect of the
employment sector on wages at dierent points of the distribution, while accounting for both
observable and time-invariant unobservable factors.
The results of the analysis conducted with standard techniques are in line with those high-
lighted by Baron and Cobb-Clark (2010) and Blau and Kahn (2003). We nd a lower level of
the GWG in the public sector with respect to the private one, but still signicant. More in-
teresting, the GWG increases along the wage distribution in both sectors. The Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition shows that the unexplained component mostly exceeds the explained part, and
the distance grows as the wage increases. This pattern is much more evident in the public
sector where we nd evidence of a glass ceiling mechanism in action. In the private sector the
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proportion of the GWG that cannot be explained by observable characteristics is higher at the
bottom of the distribution, i.e. sticky oor.
However, when we take into account the unobserved individual heterogeneity the results
of the analysis change. The evidence of a sticky oor in the private sector vanishes while the
evidence of glass ceiling in the public sector is rather amplied. However, in both sectors there
is a signicant unexplained component of the GWG throughout the distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric approach. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 reports and discusses the results about the GWG within sectors
on the basis of the cross-section analysis. Section 5 extends the analysis to take into account
the individual heterogeneity in the longitudinal sample. Section 6 concludes.
2 Econometric modelling and methodology
We estimate the wage equations by means of quantile regression, as developed by Koenker and
Bassett (1978). Following Buchinsky (1998) and assuming a linear specication, the model is
dened as
Q(yijxi) = x0i (1)
yi = x
0
i + ui (2)
where Q(yijxi) denes the conditional quantiles of the dependent variable y (log wages), given
the covariates x (individual characteristics). The distribution of the error term ui is left un-
specied and it is assumed that Q(uijxi) = 0.
To investigate the gender wage gap in the public sector, we estimate this model for men and
women separately at dierent quantiles, namely  = f0:10; 0:25; 0:50; 0:75; 0:90g. Results based
on quantile regressions provide a complete view of how the wage gaps between and within sectors
varies along the distribution. Moreover, as the quantile regression (QR) allows the regressors,
i.e. individual observable characteristics, to have a dierent impact at dierent quantiles, we
can control more deeply for dierences between men and women's wages that depend on their
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characteristics.
2.1 Quantile decomposition
To decompose the wage gap in explained and unexplained components, we make use of the
procedure proposed by Machado and Mata (2005), that generalizes the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position to a quantile regression framework. The advantage of the quantile decomposition is
that we can estimate the unexplained component of the wage gap across the distribution of
wage, that is, at any quantile of the wage distribution.
While in the Oaxaca-Blinder setting, the wage gap is divided by means of a counterfactual
wage structure, the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition is based on the construction of
a counterfactual distribution of yf , i.e. a distribution of what would be female wage, had the
wage structure been the same as the male one.
Let k 2 fm; fg represent male and female observations, so that we have samples (yki ; xki ) : i = 1; : : : ; nk	
for all populations k, and we can estimate Q(y
k) separately for the two groups.
Formally, the Machado-Mata approach to estimate the counterfactual distribution of yf can
be summarized as follows:1
1. Draw a random sample i , i = 1; 2; : : : ; 5000 from a uniform distribution U [0; 1].
2. For each i, estimate 
m() and f () as
^k(i ) = arg min
2Rp
nkX
j=1
i (y
k
j   x0kj ) k = m; f:
using the male and female dataset, respectively.2
3. randomly draw 5; 000 women with replacement and use their characteristics (xf ) to pre-
1The decomposition proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) grounds on the probability integral transformation
theorem from elementary statistics: if U is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then F 1(U) has distribution F. Thus,
for a given xi and a random   U [0; 1], x0i() has the same distribution as yijxi. If, instead of keeping xi xed,
we draw a random x from the population, x0() as the same distribution of y.
2As shown by Koenker and Bassett (1978), the quantile estimator of  solves the following minimization
problem
^() = arg min
2Rp
[
X
j:yjx0j
jyj   x0jj+
X
j:yj<x
0
j
(1  )jyj   x0jj]
.
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dict the wages using the estimated coecients m() generating a set of predicted wages,
~yf () = x
0f ^m(). The empirical c.d.f. of these values is the estimated counterfactual
distribution, namely what women would have earned if they were paid like men.
4. Then compare the counterfactual distribution with the empirical male and female dis-
tributions whose quantiles are dened by y^m() = x
0mm() and y^f () = x
0ff (),
respectively.
As in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the mean dierential, the wage gap between
males and females can be divided in two parts; one representing the eect of dierent charac-
teristics between the two groups; the other representing dierences unexplained by the quantile
regression model. The advantage of the quantile decomposition is that we can estimate the two
components across the distribution of wage, that is, at any th quantile of the wage distribution.
More precisely, we can write
ym()  yf () = [y^m()  ~yf ()] + [~yf ()  y^f ()] + residual (3)
where yk() denotes the observed log wages for k = (male; female), y^k() denotes the
estimator of the k = (male; female) log wages based on the observed sample, and ~yf () denotes
the estimated counterfactual log wages. By counterfactual, we mean the wage that females would
get, if their abilities had been rewarded according to the male pays' schedule. The residual term
captures the changes unaccounted for by the estimation method.
The rst part of the wage dierential is the so-called characteristics eect, since it is the
consequence of the dierent distribution of covariates for the two groups. The second addend
in (3) represents the so-called coecient eect (i.e. eect of the wage structure), since it is
obtained by evaluating female characteristics using two dierent conditional distributions. As
the same endowments should have the same eect on earnings for male and female, the wage
structure should not dier by gender, which is why this term represents the unexplained part of
the GPG.
In the following analysis we make use of the estimation procedure for standard errors pro-
posed by Chernozhukov, Fernez-Val, and Melly (2013). In fact, Machado and Mata (2005)
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proposed quantile regression-based estimators to evaluate distributional eects, but provided
no econometric theory for these estimators. The asymptotic behavior of the estimators' er-
ror is studied by Chernozhukov, Fernez-Val, and Melly (2013) who also show the validity of
exchangeable bootstrap methods to obtain the asymptotic covariance matrix.
2.2 Quantile regression for panel
In order to take into account the unobserved individual heterogeneity in explaining the wage
gap across the distribution, we extend our empirical analysis by exploiting the longitudinal
structure of the data.3 To this task, we consider the following quantile regression xed eect
model (hereafter FE-QR):
Q(yitjxit) = i + x0it (4)
yit = x
0
it + uit (5)
While estimation methods for cross-sectional conditional quantile regression models are well
developed, corresponding methods for panel data (especially FE models) have received attention
only recently. The FE-QR is designed to control for individual specic heterogeneity while
exploring heterogeneous covariate eects, and therefore provides a more exible method for the
analysis of panel data than that aorded by the mean regression models.
One problem associated with FE-QR is that, as it is the case with nonlinear panel data
models, the method of dierencing out the xed eects used for the conditional linear mean
model does not carry over to the conditional quantiles. Koenker (2004) proposes to treat each
individual eect as a parameter to estimate4 by means of a penalized estimation method. How-
ever, controlling xed eects by directly estimating them is not without diculty - known as
incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948), which manifest itself in inconsistency
of the common parameters when the number of individuals goes to innity while the number of
time period is xed.5
3See Section 3 for the characteristics of the data when we rely on panel observations.
4The individual xed eects are treated as pure location shift parameters common to all conditional quantiles.
5The analysis of an incidental parameter problem in FE-QR is described in Graham, Hahn, and Powell (2009)
and Kato and Galvao (2016).
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A second problem arises because the objective function is not dierentiable. The implication
is that standard asymptotic analysis of panel data model is not directly applicable to QR. Kato
and Galvao (2016) propose the smoothing of the objective function and study the properties
of the estimator. They show that the estimator is asymptotically normally distributed and
propose a bias correction for the estimator's mean. Flores, Flores-Lagunes, and Kapetanakis
(2014) estimate a two-way xed eects model where both eects vary over quantiles. Flores,
Flores-Lagunes, and Kapetanakis (2014) account for the problem of quantile crossing adopting
the method proposed by Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2010) to transform the
original estimated quantiles into monotonic ones. However, the objective function they consider
is not smooth and they rely on Monte Carlo experiment to show the small bias in their estimates.
Alternative approaches that not consider the case of unobserved heterogeneity represented by
the classical individual eects i are introduced by Harding and Lamarche (2014) who propose
a quantile regression estimator for a model with a multifactor error structure and interactive
eects potentially correlated with covariates.
In our application we follow the approach proposed by Canay (2011). In the line of research
introduced by Koenker (2004), Canay (2011) assumes a pure location shift eect for the individ-
ual parameters; i.e. the xed eects aect all quantiles in the same way. Canay (2011) proposes
an easy-to-use two-step estimator. In the rst step, the individual eects i are estimated by
traditional mean estimations (for instance estimation in rst dierences or by means of the
within estimator), then corrected wages y^it = yit   ^i are estimated on the other covariates by
means of traditional quantile regression. Given y^it we estimate the wages by quantile regression
and we rely on Machado and Mata (2005) method to decompose the wage gap in observed and
unobserved components.
We adopt the FE-QR estimator proposed by Canay (2011) for two reasons. First, it does not
add computational complexity to the estimation of the model. In fact, estimation and inference
using alternatives FE-QR may be dicult to conduct when the number of FE is large. Second,
we rely on the good nite sample properties of the estimator provided by Canay (2011) even for
low values of T.
In Section 5, to running the decomposition of the GWG across sectors we proceed as follows.
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First, we estimate, for each sector, the following two xed eects models for female and male
sample, respectively :
yfit = 
f
i + x
f
it
0f + it;f (6)
ymit = 
m
i + x
m
it
0m + it;m (7)
where f (m) stands for female (male) employee.
Second, we estimate
Q(y^
f
itjxit) = xfit0f (8)
Q(y^
m
it jxit) = xmit 0m (9)
where y^kit = y
k
it   ^ki for (k = f;m) is the log wage net out by the estimated individual het-
erogeneity. Last, we apply the Machado-Mata decomposition to compute the counterfactual
distribution of y^ and to obtain the decomposition in equation (3).
3 Data and preliminary analysis
To carry out our analysis we rely on individual data drawn from the 2005, 2006, 2008 and
2010 waves of the ISFOL-PLUS survey. ISFOL is the Italian Institute for the Development of
Vocational Training for Workers. The data was collected in the context of a joint project with
the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy that was started in 2005.6 The project aims
particularly at creating a data set for the study of wage inequality by gender. Hence, it delivers
broad information on the personal working proles and individual motivation to work as well as
on the cultural and territorial background of the participants
Since the rst PLUS survey, in 2005, each consecutive year includes a proportion of panel
interviews, taken from the previous sample. In the analysis we consider the panel dimension,
taking into account all the available years. The target population is composed of individuals
6The data was collected by means of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI).
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between 15 and 64 years old. The selection process chosen by ISFOL was stratied sampling,
with optimal allocation over ve types of domains: region, size of the municipality, gender,
age and occupational status. A multi-domain inclusion strategy was implemented to guarantee
sampling error lower than a given threshold, and signicant sampling size for each domain. One
of the main characteristics of the national survey is that only answers with direct responses were
considered, that is no proxies were used.
The ISFOL-PLUS questionnaire is composed of specic sections for ve sub-groups of the
population: young individuals between 15 and 29 years old; women between 20 and 49 years old;
elderly population between 50 and 64 years old; unemployed individuals; employed population. A
rich set of information for each of these categories is included, ranging from family characteristics
to individual skills and personal history.
Despite the fact that also self-employed and those with project-linked positions are present in
the PLUS samples, we consider only salaried employees, which form by far the largest category.
In our analysis we focus on full-time employees aged between 18 and 64 years. Facing the usual
trade-o between representativeness of the sample at the population level and the comparability
across sector, we opt in favour of the latter and make further selections for the sake of compa-
rability. We restrict the sample to those holding a full time contract and exclude trainees and
temporary contracts. Part-time workers are excluded as they have a larger dispersion in pay
than their full-time colleagues that may raise the probability of earning less than the average
hourly wage. Moreover, the incidence of part-time work diers signicantly between men and
women in favour of women (e.g. Chzhen and Mumford (2011)).
We have used log-hourly net wage (adjusted to the 2010 level) as the dependent variable.
We determine each individual's hourly wage by dividing the reported monthly salary by the
number of weeks worked in the month multiplied by the number of hours usually worked during
the week.7
We use this measure rather than monthly or annual pay to get rid of the eect of the dierent
number of hours worked by men and women. Last, we exclude blue-collars workers because they
are strongly over-represented in the private sector (about 35%) compared to the public sector
7We use net hourly wage instead of gross hourly wage because of data limitations. In fact, The ISFOL-PLUS
survey collects data on the net monthly wage for employees and on the gross monthly wage for self employed.
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(about 10%), and would make the two distributions much less comparable both in terms of
occupation types and earnings.
We have selected a group of about thirty independent variables, which include: years of
schooling; actual market experience; family characteristics (civil status, presence of pre-schooling
age children); occupation and industry dummies; geographic variables (denoting people living in
northern and central regions, and people living in urban areas); personal skills that may reveal
individual ability as knowledge of English, and knowledge of how to use a computer for particular
basic tasks. In addition to these personal skills, we consider the University Performance, that
is, the university degree score penalized for years lost.8
Table A.1 in Appendix describes the variables we use for our descriptive analyses and in the
decompositions. Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for male and female public and private
sector employees. Means of relevant variables show that, on average, men earn higher salaries
in both sectors and have a longer working history. They also show that public sector employees
are, on average, better educated than private sector employees. On the other hand, women
have more years of schooling and show higher university performance. The number of years of
schooling has been constructed from the available information on educational attainments, and
thus has a relatively low variability. Table A2 shows that workers in the public sectors have more
experience on average; they have more frequently achieved a university degree while employees
in the private sector have more often reached an high school education only.
A rst visual summary of the wage distribution across sectors, gender and within sectors is
provided in Figure 1. The density functions are estimated using Epanechnikov kernel estimator.9
Figure 1 shows that in both sectors, private and public, the female wage distribution is shifted
to the left with respect to the men's one, which gives us a preliminary evidence of a GWG.
However, at this preliminary stage, we are considering only the unconditional wage distribution,
without taking into account possible factors aecting it.
8The variable University Performance is a proxy of the unobserved ability for graduate individuals. The use of
this variable has been proposed by Castagnetti and Rosti (2009). It is given by the nal degree score eventually
penalized by the number of years in excess used to get the degree. For a complete denition of the variable see
Table A1 in Appendix A.
9The bandwidth is chosen in order to minimize the mean integrated squared error where the data are Gaussian
and a Gaussian kernel is used. We choose to adopt this criteria, that is the default option in STATA to minimize
the degree of discretionary in presenting the results.
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Figure 1: Kernel-density estimates of hourly net log-wages by gender and sector
The regression-based decompositions of Sections 4-5 are based on quantile estimation whose
main strength lies in the fact that it allows to estimate productivity and coecients gender
dierentials across the wage distribution. As preliminary step in the investigation of the eects
of dierences in characteristics on the GWG by sector, we carry out a series of quantile regressions
on the pooled data. Pooled quantile regressions shown in Tables A3-A4 estimate the wage by
sector including in addition to standard individual and work-related characteristics, a gender
dummy to identify the GWG.
In reading the Tables, recall that each coecient represents the eect on wage, at a given
quantile, of a shift in the corresponding covariate, keeping all else constant. The standard errors
were computed, using the bootstrap method with 800 replications, a procedure that involves
weaker assumptions with regard to the distributional form taken by the variables of interest,
since it provides a consistent estimate even in the presence of heteroskedasticity.10
The overall specication of the model seems to t well, and most of the reported coecients
have the predicted signs. It is worth noticing that the GWG, catched by the parameter of the
10Two good and short reviews on inference methods for quantile regression are given by Buchinsky (1995) and
by Buchinsky (1998). For a more comprehensive treatment of the topic, see Koenker (2005).
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dummy variable Female, when the homogeneity of parameters by gender is imposed, appears
larger in the public sector.
A second evidence coming out from this model is that the return on the University Perfor-
mance is higher in the public sector. On the contrary, the other variables for individual ability
have a stronger inuence on the wage in the private sector.
Finally, while the dummies denoting the presence of children are signicant only for a small
number of quantiles and mostly in the public sector, the variables denoting civil status are
statistically signicant in both sectors and across the whole distribution.
4 Cross-section decomposition
In order to decompose the dierences in the wage distribution according to Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition we apply the Machado and Mata (2005) procedure described in Section 2.1. While
the preliminary dummy-based approach presented in Section 3, owns the important shortcoming
of assuming that the return to individual and job characteristics are the same across gender, the
Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition relies on the estimation of quantile wage regressions
for both gender and sector.
We estimate four dierent specications, denoted in Table A5 by columns A-D. Specication
A represents a basic extended version of the Mincer equation, that we augment sequentially by
indicators of individual productivity/ability (specication B), by occupational dummy variables
( specication C) up to the inclusion of dummies for industry classication (specication D).
Tables A6-A9 present the estimation results at ve quantiles of the wage distribution for spec-
ication D of Table A5.11 These results allow us to evaluate the overall accuracy of our wage
specications, to test the signicance of each of our proxies for productivity, and to appreciate
any dierence, among the sector and the gender dimensions, in the shape taken by the wage
structure.
A rst evidence coming out from this model is that the return on schooling is stronger for
women at lower quantiles while the reverse happens for higher quantiles of the wage distribution.
11For the sake of saving space we report only the detailed estimation results of specication D. The results of
the remaining specications are available upon request.
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More, the return on experience is always stronger for men in both sectors.
In general we observe that occupational dummies tend to be more signicant than industrial
dummies in both sectors and for both genders. Finally, while the dummies denoting the presence
of children are statistically signicant only for a small number of quantiles, the variable denoting
civil status tends to be more signicant, especially among men. To sum up, we can draw a couple
of preliminary conclusions, and try to make connections with some of the recent ndings in the
empirical literature. The dynamics of the schooling coecient, on one hand, suggest that there
might be an increasing pattern, in the GWG, for graduated women. This evidence is in line
with the ndings of de la Rica, Dolado, and Llorens (2008), who show that, in Spain, the wage
gap increases along the distribution of wage for higher educated women. On the contrary, the
presence of a oor pattern, that is, of a decreasing wage gap for lower educated women, at this
stage, is dicult to assess.
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Figure 2: Gender wage gap decomposition, divided by sector. Specication A in Table A5. 95%
condence intervals.
The decomposition by sector of the GWG presented in Figures 2 and 5 lead to several
observations. First, in both sectors, the relative wages are increasing across the distribution
and the GWG in the private sector is always bigger than those in the public sector. When
we look at the decomposition of the GWG, we observe that a signicant part of the gender
wage gap remains unexplained in both sectors, after controlling for individual characteristics,
education, job attributes and regional specic eects. Moreover, the weight of the unobserved
component in explaining the gender wage gap is always bigger in the public sector with respect
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Figure 3: Gender wage gap decomposition, divided by sector. Specication B in Table A5. 95%
condence intervals.
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Figure 4: Gender wage gap decomposition, divided by sector. Specication C in Table A5. 95%
condence intervals.
to the private sector. We observe also that the coecients component decreases along the wage
distribution for the private sector while it increases for the public sector. Comparing the two
sectors, we observe that among high wage workers, the wage gap faced by women is completely
unexplained in the public sector while is mostly unexplained in the private sector. In other
words, the discrimination component looks much stronger for the public sector. More deeply, it
appears that high-wage public-sector employees in Italy may face more employer discrimination
(i.e., glass ceilings) than low wage workers (i.e., sticky oors).12
This result contrasts with the ndings of Melly (2005) for the Germany but conrms the
12In particular, the part of GWG attributed to the wage structure goes from about 50% for the lower quantiles
to about 90% at highest quantiles.
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Figure 5: Gender wage gap decomposition, divided by sector. Specication D in Table A5. 95%
condence intervals.
ndings of Baron and Cobb-Clark (2010). Further, Arulamplam, Booth, and Bryan (2007)
and Kee (2006) nd no evidence of sticky oors in public sector employment for Europe and
Australia, respectively.
When we look at the private sector, instead, we observe that, unlike the public, the unex-
plained component of the conditional GWG decreases along the wage distribution. Therefore,
it seems that employer discrimination is more prevalent among low-wage employees than among
their high-wage counterparts. Thus, contrary to what found for the public-sector, the mechanism
in action seems to be of sticky oors rather than glass ceilings.
However, when we control for occupation and industry the relative weight of the observed
characteristics on the GWG increases only for the private sector. The change in the contribution
of the wage structure to the GWG goes in the same direction; while it decreases for the private
sector it looks rather stable for the public one. One implication is that apparently there is an
eect of gender segregation in the private sector while no evidence is found for the public one.
5 Longitudinal decomposition
The rst step in the longitudinal analysis is the xed eects estimation of the wage equation
by gender and sector. The Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition is then applied on the
wage net by the estimated individual heterogeneity (see Section 2). As for the cross section
analysis, we rst estimate a model that excludes occupation, industry and individual ability
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controls from the vector of labour market position variables (specication A). We then repeat
the estimation/decomposition exercise adding controls for measures of ability (specication B),
for occupation (specication C) and for industry (specication D). In this way we want to identify
the extent to which the results are driven by occupational and industrial segregation. In the
spirit of the analysis of Arulamplam, Booth, and Bryan (2007), this procedure also may provide
insights into the sensitivity of the unexplained component (i.e. the eect of the wage structure)
to alternative assumptions about the discriminatory nature of the occupational distribution
itself.13
Tables A10 - A13 show the estimation results at ve quantiles of the net wage14 distribution
for Specication D of Table A5.15 These results allow us to evaluate the overall accuracy of
our wage specication, to test the signicance of each of our proxies for productivity, and to
evaluate any dierence, among the sector and the gender dimensions, in the shape taken by the
wage structure. At this stage, the comparison with the estimation results of Section 4 does not
provide evidence on important dierences. The only exception is represented by the role of social
variables as dummies for the parents' degree whose coecients now become highly statistical
signicant.
The decomposition analysis in Figures 6-9 shows important dierences with respect to the
results presented in Section 4. First, in both sectors the GWG markedly reduces once the
individual heterogeneity has been taken into account. Second, the evidence found of a glass
ceilings in the public sector is still valid while the weight of the eect of the wage structure
on the GWG is rather stable across the distribution in the private sector. Third, in the public
sector the gender dierence in observed characteristics is statistically signicant only at lower
quantile of the distribution. The private sector, unlike the public, shows a statistically signicant
contribution of the characteristics throughout the wage distribution.
Moreover, the rate of increase of the GWG across the distribution is much lower in the public
sector while the opposite was true in the cross section analysis. In the private sector, the control
for individual heterogeneity shows a weaker impact on the wage decomposition. It is true that
13We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this question.
14y^kit in (8) and (9).
15For the sake of saving space we report only the detailed estimation results of specication D. The results for
the alternative specications are available upon request.
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the level of the GWG in the public sector is lower across the distribution with respect to the
cross section analysis but the evidence of sticky oor in the private sector vanishes. Like the
public sector, the decomposition results for the private sector show that the GWG rises as the
wage level increases.
A further important evidence arises from the impact on the decomposition of the introduction
of measures of occupation and industry into the set of controls for labour market; introducing
these controls does not have a large impact on the decomposition between sectors (see Figures 6-
9). Dierently from the cross section, the longitudinal analysis does not support the evidence of
segregation eect. The percentage of the GWG accounted for by the observed and unobserved
factors (namely the eect of characteristics and the wage structure eect) remains roughly
unchanged. Hence, there is no information gain from controlling from proxies of individual
ability, occupation and industry allocation. It seems that the eect of segregation highlighted in
the cross section analysis was only apparent. Indeed the individual heterogeneity explains much
more.
One important result that emerges is that, also when the estimation is netted from the
individual heterogeneity, the evidence that the magnitude (and source) of the gender wage gap
varies across labour market sectors clearly supports the view that wage-setting mechanisms dier
in the two sectors.
One side that cannot be omitted to explain these dierences is the hiring method used in
the two sectors. In Italy public servants are still generally recruited through public contests that
are a special recruitment method of open competition. Public contests increase the accuracy
of assessment as they require the use of objective criteria and justication of the candidate
choice thereby increasing the probability of fair assessment for both men and women compared
to other recruitment methods. Dobbs and Crano (2001) argue that individuals who have to
justify their decisions have a stronger incentive to bypass their stereotyped impressions than
those that do not have to provide justications. As a consequence, when decision makers are
required to justify their choices and describe the criteria they use to evaluate candidates, as in
open competition, they are less likely to discriminate against a specic group.
Therefore the lower GWG in the public sector can be the result of both the dierent hiring
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selection method and of a greater eort in the application of gender equality policies.
The explanation of the higher weight of the unexplained component of the GWG in the public
sector is twofold. At the bottom of the distribution, the unexplained component may cover non
monetary benets oered by the public sector. At the top of the distribution, the increasing
weight of the wage eect may hide a sort of favoritism in the public sector for men rather than
a discrimination against women. As a matter of fact, the top management job positions in the
public sector, are often linked to political appointment that in prevalence support males more
than females.
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Figure 6: Fixed eects gender wage gap by sector. Specication A in Table A5. 95% condence
intervals.
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Figure 7: Fixed eects gender wage gap by sector. Specication B in Table A5. 95% condence
intervals.
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Figure 8: Fixed eects gender wage gap by sector. Specication C in Table A5. 95% condence
intervals.
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Figure 9: Fixed eects gender wage gap by sector. Specication D in Table A5. 95% condence
intervals.
6 Conclusion
The signicant and persistent level of the GWG has obtained much attention from policy makers
and researchers leading to the implementation of an equal-pay legislation and the promotion of
equal opportunities in many countries. Starting from 2008, the GWG has been introduced among
the indicators for monitoring occupation policies in the European Union countries. Despite the
important eort devoted to combat it,16 in Europe women are paid on average 16:3% less
than men. To tackle the GWG it is essential to understand and decompose it in terms of
explained (observed) and unexplained (unobserved) components. In this paper, we investigate
16The European Commission is adopting an Action Plan to defeat the gender pay gap in the next biennium.
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the decomposition by gender of the wage in the Italian public and private sector. Using quantile
regression methods we perform the analysis for both cross section and panel data. For the
latter we perform the analysis by considering the quantile approach for panel data proposed by
Canay (2011). In order to assess how the GWG varies across the wage distribution we propose
a two step procedure for computing the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. First, we estimate the
GWG by means of Canay (2011) approach and then we run the Machado and Mata (2005)
decomposition for quantile regression.
Because of the more standardized career path in the public sector with respect to the private
one and the dierent hiring selection method (by competition in the public sector), the unex-
plained component of the gender wage gap, at least at the beginning of the career, should be
lower with respect to those for the private one because the so called discrimination components
should be counteracted. Hence, we expect a larger unexplained component for the GWG in the
private sector with respect to the public counterpart.
The main results are as follows. In line with the ndings in the literature we conrm the
substantially higher level of the GWG in the private sector with respect to the public sector.
When we control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity, we nd a consistent decrease of
the GWG and of the slope of the wage curve in both sector. The evidence based on the cross
section analysis of a sticky oor eect in the private sector vanishes, while the public sector
still shows a glass ceiling eect even if resized. However, in both sectors there is a signicant
unexplained GWG whose weight is larger in the public sector throughout the wage distribution.
We propose the following explanation for these results. From one side, the lower GWG in
the public sector can be the result of both the dierent hiring selection method and of putting
more eort in the application of policies for gender equality. From the other side, the increasing
weight of the wage eect (unexplained component of the GWG) observed in the public sector at
the top of the distribution may hide a sort of favoritism for men rather than a discrimination
for women. As a matter of fact, the top management job positions in the public sector, are often
linked to political appointment that in prevalence support males more than females. At the
bottom of the distribution, the higher weight of the unexplained component of the GWG in the
public sector may cover non monetary benets oered by the public sector that, particulary in
23
Italy, have an important role in the welfare system and labor market wage setting. In contrast
with poor care supports oered by the national welfare regime, public employment in Italy may
represent in fact a tool to reconcile work and family activities, see Solera and Bettio (2013).
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Appendix A. Denition of Variables
Table A1: Denition of Variables
Variable Name Denition
Log net hourly wage Natural logarithm of hourly wages in Euros
net of taxes and social security contributions
Female One if the individual is woman, zero otherwise
Experience Number of years of work experience
Experience2 Experience squared
Tenure Number of years worked for current employer
Schooling Number of years of schooling completed
University Degree One if the individual has graduated from university, zero otherwise
University Performance DegreeScore1+0:1Y ears where Degree Score is the degree mark plus the laude
or highest honors when it occurs. Years is the number of years in excess used
to get the degree. In the Italian education system, each faculty only sets
a minimum number of years in which to obtain a degree. As a consequence
there is a high dispersion in the age at which students graduate. The
speed of completion of the academic career is, therefore, together
with the nal mark, an important component of educational performance.
The degree scores have been normalized to take into account the
dierent marking scale for each faculty. The nal degree score ranges from
66 to 110 (for some universities the maximum mark awarded is 100).
According to each faculty internal ruling a laude (distinction) may be
assigned to candidates with a 110/110 mark for recognition of the excellence
of their thesis (in the analysis the 110 cum laude is considered as 111).
High School One if highest education was high school, zero otherwise
Secondary Education One if highest degree obtained was secondary education, zero otherwise
Primary Education One if highest education obtained was primary education, zero otherwise
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Knowledge of English One if the individual answer "yes" to all the questions of PLUS
questionnaire on the ability to speak and understand English, zero otherwise
Computer skill One if the individual answer "yes" to all the questions of PLUS
questionnaire on the ability to using PC, zero otherwise
North One if the individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if the individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Age Age of the individual (in years)
Married One if the individual is married, zero otherwise
Kids One if the individual has at least one child, zero otherwise
Kids 10 One if the age of the youngest child is below 10 years, zero otherwise
In the wave of 2005, Kids 10 is equal to one if there is at least one child
below the age of three in the household, zero otherwise
Italian One if the individual holds the Italian citizenship, zero otherwise
Mother's university degree One if the mother's education is equal to University Degree, i.e. the
mother holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Father's university degree One if the father's education is equal to University Degree, i.e. the
father holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Metropolitan Area One if individual is located in a metropolitan area, zero otherwise
Permanent Contract One if the individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Manager One if the respective individual is occupied in an intellectual profession;
scientic or highly specialized occupations, zero otherwise
Intermediate Profession One if the respective individual is occupied in an intermediary position
in the commercial, technical or administrative sector, in health services or
is a technician, zero otherwise
White-collars worker One if the respective individual is occupied in an intermediary position
in the commercial, technical or administrative sector, in health services or
is a technician, zero otherwise
textBlue  collarsworker One if the respective individual is
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handicraftsmen, factory worker (skilled and unskilled) and worker
for unqualied jobs
Agriculture One if the individual is engaged in agriculture, hunting and shing, zero otherwise
Manufacturing One if the individual is engaged in manufacturing, zero otherwise
Energy One if the individual is engaged in energy, zero otherwise
Construction One if the individual is engaged in construction, zero otherwise
Retail One if the individual is engaged in retail and wholesale, zero otherwise
Tourism One if the individual is engaged in tourism, zero otherwise
Transport One if the individual is engaged in transport, warehousing
and logistic, zero otherwise
Finance One if the individual is engaged in nance and insurance services,
zero otherwise
Health One if the individual is engaged in health and care, zero otherwise
Telecommunication One if the individual is engaged in telecommunication, zero otherwise
Government Administration One if the individual is engaged in government administration,
zero otherwise
Education One if the individual is engaged in education, zero otherwise
AdminServices One if the individual is engaged in administrative services,
zero otherwise
Other Services One if the individual is engaged in other rms and business services,
zero otherwise
Public Sector One if individual is employed in the public sector, zero otherwise
Big Firm One if rm has at least 10,000 workers, zero otherwise
Year 1-Year 3 Year dummies, one if year = 2005, 2006, 2008, respectively,
and zero otherwise
Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics
Private Public
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Net hourly wage 1.916 0.405 2.157 0.366
Net hourly wage - women 1.826 0.383 2.087 0.330
Net hourly wage - men 1.975 0.408 2.216 0.384
Female 0.391 0.488 0.456 0.498
Age 36.919 12.772 45.804 11.885
Age - women 34.735 11.581 44.151 11.675
Age - men 38.319 13.293 47.188 11.884
Married 0.464 0.499 0.685 0.464
Kids 0.611 0.487 0.724 0.447
Kids 10 0.099 0.299 0.085 0.279
Mother's university degree 0.031 0.174 0.034 0.181
Father's university degree 0.044 0.205 0.076 0.265
Experience 16.404 12.829 23.968 11.825
Monthly hours worked 180.745 22.974 168.482 22.363
Permanent contracts 0.520 0.500 0.525 0.499
Tenure 10.460 10.706 18.669 11.549
Big Firm 0.414 0.493 0.468 0.499
North 0.540 0.498 0.391 0.488
Centre 0.191 0.393 0.196 0.397
Metropolitan area 0.267 0.442 0.337 0.473
Education
University degree 0.165 0.371 0.332 0.471
University degree - women 0.206 0.404 0.387 0.487
University degree - men 0.139 0.346 0.285 0.451
University performance - women 95.63 11.05 97.89 11.25
University performance - men 92.47 12.86 94.75 12.01
High School 0.594 0.491 0.521 0.500
Secondary Education 0.219 0.413 0.137 0.343
Primary Education 0.022 0.148 0.011 0.105
Knowledge of English 0.335 0.472 0.266 0.442
Computer skill 0.827 0.378 0.831 0.375
Occupation
Managers 0.096 0.295 0.254 0.435
Intermediate professions 0.140 0.347 0.201 0.401
White-collars workers 0.435 0.496 0.432 0.495
Blue-collars workers 0.328 0.470 0.112 0.316
Sector
Agriculture 0.022 0.146 0.011 0.102
Manufacturing 0.156 0.363 0.013 0.114
Energy 0.099 0.299 0.016 0.124
Construction 0.039 0.193 0.007 0.083
Retail 0.097 0.296 0.012 0.108
Tourism 0.051 0.219 0.008 0.092
Transport 0.103 0.304 0.029 0.168
Finance 0.062 0.242 0.020 0.138
Health 0.022 0.146 0.129 0.335
Telecommunication 0.081 0.272 0.031 0.174
Government Administration 0.044 0.205 0.244 0.430
Education 0.029 0.169 0.231 0.422
AdminServices 0.050 0.219 0.115 0.319
Other Services 0.144 0.351 0.135 0.341
No of observations 21530 11227
See Appendix A for the denition of the variables.
31
Table A3: Quantile Regression of Wage in the Private sector.
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0193*** 0.0170*** 0.0195*** 0.0199*** 0.0212***
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0025)
Experience 0.0341*** 0.0234*** 0.0212*** 0.0203*** 0.0205***
(0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0020)
Experience2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.085*** -0.112*** -0.131***
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0064)
Agriculture -0.042 -0.078 -0.075*** -0.094** -0.106***
(0.0662) (0.0583) (0.0232) (0.0416) (0.0383)
Manufacturing -0.012 -0.015 -0.026** -0.060*** -0.068***
(0.0265) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0226)
Energy 0.0011 0.0036 -0.025** -0.060*** -0.079***
(0.0288) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0182) (0.0152)
Construction -0.077 -0.021 0.0030 -0.038*** -0.069**
(0.0603) (0.0220) (0.0167) (0.0132) (0.0302)
Retail -0.031 -0.029*** -0.046*** -0.087*** -0.106***
(0.0274) (0.0079) (0.0092) (0.0121) (0.0174)
Tourism -0.034 -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.081*** -0.073***
(0.0341) (0.0196) (0.0113) (0.0149) (0.0267)
Transport -0.026 -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.076*** -0.078***
(0.0170) (0.0143) (0.0096) (0.0149) (0.0205)
Finance 0.0251 0.0134 0.0043 0.0048 -0.005
(0.0178) (0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0205)
Health -0.085** -0.062* -0.058*** -0.051* -0.066
(0.0338) (0.0375) (0.0208) (0.0272) (0.0493)
Telecommunication 0.0027 0.0146 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008
(0.0344) (0.0138) (0.0093) (0.0119) (0.0188)
Government Administration -0.046 -0.011 -0.011 -0.039** -0.061***
(0.0473) (0.0232) (0.0161) (0.0167) (0.0141)
Education 0.0285*** -0.020* -0.030** -0.061*** -0.077**
(0.0092) (0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0178) (0.0319)
AdminServices -0.068** -0.055*** -0.048*** -0.070*** -0.092***
(0.0322) (0.0141) (0.0180) (0.0125) (0.0200)
Permanent Contract 0.0252* 0.0069 0.0126*** -0.006 -0.013
(0.0137) (0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0091) (0.0136)
Big rm 0.1051*** 0.0770*** 0.0710*** 0.0595*** 0.0538***
(0.0149) (0.0088) (0.0054) (0.0080) (0.0083)
Manager -0.031 0.0497*** 0.0713*** 0.1036*** 0.1483***
(0.0199) (0.0123) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0129)
Intermediate Profession 0.0180 0.0158 0.0203** 0.0248** 0.0508**
(0.0143) (0.0110) (0.0097) (0.0120) (0.0203)
Married 0.0657*** 0.0574*** 0.0758*** 0.0823*** 0.0799***
(0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0058) (0.0087) (0.0116)
Kids 0.0041 0.0073 0.0133** 0.0101* 0.0133
(0.0123) (0.0074) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0120)
Kids 10 0.0206 0.0115 0.0089 0.0161 0.0170
(0.0145) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0155) (0.0206)
University Performance 0.0004 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Knowledge of English -0.004 0.0170** 0.0247*** 0.0231*** 0.0345***
(0.0141) (0.0085) (0.0060) (0.0085) (0.0094)
Computer skill 0.0976*** 0.0903*** 0.0892*** 0.0864*** 0.0777***
(0.0186) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0152) (0.0143)
University degree father -0.034 -0.007 0.0234*** 0.0408** 0.0853***
(0.0395) (0.0144) (0.0082) (0.0168) (0.0218)
University degree mother 0.0749 0.0229** -0.001 -0.004 -0.011
(0.0555) (0.0099) (0.0124) (0.0168) (0.0207)
Metropolitan area -0.023*** -0.002 0.0066 -0.002 -0.009
(0.0062) (0.0072) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0106)
North 0.1727*** 0.0930*** 0.0547*** 0.0560*** 0.0476***
(0.0165) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0099) (0.0107)
Centre 0.1409*** 0.0749*** 0.0350*** 0.0304** 0.0476***
(0.0224) (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0121) (0.0143)
Time eects X X X X X
Constant 0.6759*** 1.0980*** 1.2632*** 1.4512*** 1.5884***
(0.0435) (0.0316) (0.0297) (0.0324) (0.0311)
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A4: Quantile Regression of Wage in the Public sector.
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0139*** 0.0138*** 0.0154*** 0.0172*** 0.0203***
(0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0021)
Experience 0.0329*** 0.0247*** 0.0202*** 0.0213*** 0.0232***
(0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0019)
Experience2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female -0.059*** -0.071*** -0.095*** -0.138*** -0.158***
(0.0069) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0120)
Agriculture -0.023 -0.078** -0.102*** -0.126** -0.045
(0.0257) (0.0388) (0.0272) (0.0583) (0.0421)
Manufacturing -0.049 0.0253 0.0009 -0.058* -0.107
(0.0705) (0.0396) (0.0507) (0.0300) (0.0716)
Energy 0.0075 0.0142 -0.015 -0.027 -0.125*
(0.0740) (0.0282) (0.0135) (0.0214) (0.0698)
Construction -0.064 -0.008 -0.015 -0.018 -0.015
(0.0764) (0.0344) (0.0279) (0.0596) (0.0445)
Retail -0.196** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.122*** -0.094**
(0.0982) (0.0266) (0.0194) (0.0227) (0.0421)
Tourism -0.025 -0.007 -0.052* -0.067* -0.083**
(0.0593) (0.0339) (0.0284) (0.0373) (0.0336)
Transport -0.022 0.0145 0.0007 0.0438* 0.0194
(0.0348) (0.0203) (0.0163) (0.0252) (0.0312)
Finance -0.024 0.0034 -0.035 -0.041 -0.056
(0.0596) (0.0265) (0.0255) (0.0297) (0.0366)
Health -0.041* -0.036** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.092***
(0.0217) (0.0145) (0.0126) (0.0171) (0.0160)
Telecommunication 0.0032 -0.009 0.0135 0.0109 -0.022
(0.0476) (0.0214) (0.0277) (0.0281) (0.0378)
Government Administration -0.019* -0.014 -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.062***
(0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0140) (0.0088)
Education -0.016 -0.014** -0.024*** -0.022* -0.030***
(0.0125) (0.0060) (0.0090) (0.0116) (0.0115)
AdminServices 0.0087 0.0248** 0.0314** 0.0517*** 0.0064
(0.0162) (0.0102) (0.0144) (0.0191) (0.0210)
Permanent Contract 0.0221** 0.0025 0.0164 0.0107 0.0080
(0.0097) (0.0106) (0.0133) (0.0095) (0.0196)
Big rm 0.0168 0.0090 0.0261 0.0425** 0.0486
(0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0336)
Manager 0.0101 0.0670*** 0.1143*** 0.2001*** 0.2746***
(0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0089) (0.0157) (0.0219)
Intermediate Profession 0.0139 0.0455*** 0.0597*** 0.0520*** 0.0509***
(0.0095) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0093) (0.0105)
Married 0.0400** 0.0259*** 0.0289*** 0.0325*** 0.0302*
(0.0180) (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0076) (0.0156)
Kids 0.0205** 0.0155** 0.0123** 0.0179** 0.0132
(0.0095) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0088) (0.0123)
Kids 10 0.0351** 0.0300*** 0.0328*** 0.0229 0.0138
(0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0083) (0.0146) (0.0115)
University Performance 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0019***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Knowledge of English 0.0059 0.0001 0.0077 0.0205*** 0.0264***
(0.0124) (0.0080) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0092)
Computer skill 0.0333*** 0.0543*** 0.0564*** 0.0541*** 0.0489***
(0.0105) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0063) (0.0140)
University degree father -0.001 -0.002 0.0305*** 0.0400** 0.0334
(0.0386) (0.0147) (0.0102) (0.0192) (0.0267)
University degree mother -0.000 -0.024 -0.028 -0.007 0.0151
(0.0287) (0.0185) (0.0222) (0.0234) (0.0350)
Metropolitan area -0.003 -0.009 -0.011** -0.012 -0.007
(0.0137) (0.0085) (0.0055) (0.0109) (0.0129)
North 0.0067 -0.000 -0.001 0.0054 0.0130
(0.0126) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0064) (0.0156)
Centre 0.0010 -0.004 -0.000 0.0148 0.0528***
(0.0100) (0.0097) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0156)
Constant 1.1657*** 1.3861*** 1.5238*** 1.6053*** 1.7006***
(0.0373) (0.0314) (0.0252) (0.0242) (0.0485)
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A5: Specication
A B C D
Schooling X X X X
Experience X X X X
Experience2 X X X X
Permanent Contract X X X X
Big rm X X X X
Married X X X X
Kids X X X X
Kids 10 X X X X
University degree father X X X X
University degree mother X X X X
Metropolitan area X X X X
North X X X X
Centre X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Measures of individual abilitya X X X
Occupational dummiesb X X
Sectorsc X
a University Performance, Knowledge of English, Computer skill.
b Manager and Intermediate Profession, White collar is the reference category.
c 13 Sectors, Other Services is the reference category.
See Appendix A for the denition of the variables.
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Table A6: Quantile Regression of Wage for Males in Private Sector. Specication D.
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0184*** 0.0168*** 0.0210*** 0.0210*** 0.0223***
(0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0031)
Experience 0.0351*** 0.0250*** 0.0237*** 0.0256*** 0.0237***
(0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture -0.0775 -0.1324 -0.1078*** -0.1025 -0.1757***
(0.1034) (0.0927) (0.0394) (0.0719) (0.0532)
Manufacturing -0.0298 -0.0204 -0.0305 -0.0638*** -0.0842***
(0.0283) (0.0284) (0.0185) (0.0220) (0.0229)
Energy 0.0150 0.0221 -0.0166 -0.0441** -0.0873***
(0.0453) (0.0195) (0.0116) (0.0213) (0.0297)
Construction -0.0838 -0.0145 -0.0136 -0.0706** -0.1331***
(0.0722) (0.0346) (0.0190) (0.0299) (0.0284)
Retail 0.0123 -0.0195 -0.0453** -0.0692*** -0.0963**
(0.0331) (0.0258) (0.0178) (0.0266) (0.0391)
Tourism -0.0183 -0.0578** -0.0499** -0.0627* -0.0223
(0.0279) (0.0268) (0.0248) (0.0324) (0.0489)
Transport -0.0201 -0.0448* -0.0544*** -0.0724*** -0.0664**
(0.0199) (0.0240) (0.0178) (0.0158) (0.0269)
Finance 0.0378 0.0212 -0.0067 -0.0169 -0.0691***
(0.0262) (0.0173) (0.0145) (0.0178) (0.0161)
Health -0.1126 -0.0323 -0.0541* -0.0252 -0.0500
(0.1085) (0.0655) (0.0282) (0.0377) (0.0431)
Telecommunication -0.0165 0.0220 0.0013 -0.0211 -0.0213
(0.0380) (0.0295) (0.0273) (0.0261) (0.0363)
Government Administration 0.0185 -0.0039 -0.0112 -0.0430 -0.0575
(0.0570) (0.0396) (0.0242) (0.0338) (0.0413)
Education 0.0359 -0.0225 -0.0620* -0.0624 -0.0534
(0.0291) (0.0247) (0.0345) (0.0401) (0.0482)
AdminServices -0.0485 -0.0578* -0.0768** -0.0858*** -0.0932**
(0.0527) (0.0343) (0.0326) (0.0313) (0.0460)
Permanent Contract 0.0268 0.0084 0.0090 0.0033 -0.0324**
(0.0193) (0.0123) (0.0097) (0.0128) (0.0155)
Big rm 0.0833*** 0.0698*** 0.0537*** 0.0420*** 0.0366**
(0.0172) (0.0111) (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0146)
Manager 0.0110 0.0651*** 0.0766*** 0.1026*** 0.1736***
(0.0448) (0.0165) (0.0148) (0.0180) (0.0320)
Intermediate Profession -0.0046 0.0038 0.0095* 0.0224** 0.0517***
(0.0225) (0.0089) (0.0048) (0.0109) (0.0191)
Married 0.0572** 0.0612*** 0.1006*** 0.1109*** 0.1317***
(0.0258) (0.0128) (0.0081) (0.0205) (0.0202)
Kids 0.0389** 0.0161 0.0138** -0.0110 -0.0114
(0.0153) (0.0113) (0.0056) (0.0087) (0.0138)
Kids 10 0.0134 0.0122 0.0221 0.0106 0.0153
(0.0174) (0.0198) (0.0158) (0.0171) (0.0292)
University Performance 0.0004** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Knowledge of English -0.0235 0.0154** 0.0224*** 0.0249*** 0.0360***
(0.0153) (0.0069) (0.0079) (0.0093) (0.0127)
Computer skill 0.0668 0.0628*** 0.0835*** 0.1013*** 0.0816***
(0.0423) (0.0167) (0.0120) (0.0215) (0.0201)
University degree father 0.0112 0.0258 0.0408** 0.0653*** 0.1069***
(0.0439) (0.0200) (0.0191) (0.0228) (0.0349)
University degree mother -0.0119 0.0062 -0.0225 -0.0242* -0.0460
(0.0657) (0.0198) (0.0159) (0.0134) (0.0293)
Metropolitan area 0.0085 0.0077 0.0016 -0.0099 -0.0233
(0.0213) (0.0090) (0.0046) (0.0085) (0.0171)
North 0.1443*** 0.0746*** 0.0544*** 0.0582*** 0.0623***
(0.0273) (0.0127) (0.0096) (0.0088) (0.0168)
Centre 0.1104*** 0.0462** 0.0164 0.0190 0.0520*
(0.0384) (0.0209) (0.0173) (0.0193) (0.0298)
Constant 0.7310*** 1.1074*** 1.2423*** 1.3734*** 1.5490***
(0.0664) (0.0214) (0.0367) (0.0366) (0.0768)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A7: Quantile Regression of Wage for Females in Private Sector. Specication D.
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0251*** 0.0178*** 0.0151*** 0.0158*** 0.0216***
(0.0058) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0033)
Experience 0.0310*** 0.0220*** 0.0186*** 0.0166*** 0.0177***
(0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Experience2 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture -0.0796 -0.0284 -0.0589 -0.0563 -0.1027***
(0.1319) (0.0963) (0.0585) (0.0573) (0.0260)
Manufacturing -0.0034 -0.0155 -0.0328 -0.0617*** -0.0639*
(0.0334) (0.0203) (0.0245) (0.0099) (0.0333)
Energy -0.0614** -0.0377* -0.0554*** -0.0735*** -0.1041**
(0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0179) (0.0194) (0.0463)
Construction -0.0720 -0.0393 0.0326 0.0117 -0.0051
(0.1075) (0.0410) (0.0364) (0.0394) (0.0334)
Retail -0.0866*** -0.0503** -0.0511*** -0.0908*** -0.1131***
(0.0283) (0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0168) (0.0401)
Tourism -0.1262*** -0.0948** -0.0970*** -0.1203*** -0.0906
(0.0433) (0.0376) (0.0165) (0.0148) (0.0571)
Transport -0.0554* -0.0413** -0.0399*** -0.0855*** -0.0883***
(0.0318) (0.0169) (0.0145) (0.0091) (0.0176)
Finance -0.0047 -0.0068 0.0146 0.0073 0.0435
(0.0363) (0.0187) (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0377)
Health -0.1203* -0.0766* -0.0571** -0.0546** -0.0453
(0.0622) (0.0411) (0.0225) (0.0221) (0.0344)
Telecommunication -0.0144 -0.0024 0.0064 -0.0087 0.0168
(0.0271) (0.0158) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0450)
Government Administration -0.1179*** -0.0390* -0.0102 -0.0462** -0.0464
(0.0438) (0.0210) (0.0128) (0.0190) (0.0344)
Education -0.0020 -0.0214 -0.0092 -0.0481*** -0.0810**
(0.0262) (0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0159) (0.0401)
AdminServices -0.0803*** -0.0547* -0.0292** -0.0705*** -0.0813***
(0.0271) (0.0297) (0.0135) (0.0174) (0.0290)
Permanent Contract 0.0123 0.0122 0.0068 -0.0143** -0.0107
(0.0179) (0.0154) (0.0092) (0.0066) (0.0119)
Big rm 0.1262*** 0.0757*** 0.0791*** 0.0714*** 0.0708***
(0.0255) (0.0137) (0.0116) (0.0078) (0.0148)
Manager -0.1020*** 0.0251 0.0593*** 0.1035*** 0.1010***
(0.0235) (0.0232) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0291)
Intermediate Profession 0.0462 0.0321*** 0.0280** 0.0443*** 0.0369*
(0.0287) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0110) (0.0190)
Married 0.0392* 0.0366*** 0.0465*** 0.0547*** 0.0460***
(0.0203) (0.0117) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0122)
Kids -0.0361* -0.0108 0.0155* 0.0170*** 0.0340***
(0.0189) (0.0112) (0.0091) (0.0060) (0.0114)
Kids 10 0.0272 0.0246 0.0146 0.0276* 0.0131
(0.0226) (0.0154) (0.0101) (0.0150) (0.0171)
University Performance -0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0006***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Knowledge of English 0.0165 0.0138 0.0254** 0.0239*** 0.0192
(0.0163) (0.0114) (0.0099) (0.0064) (0.0161)
Computer skill 0.1345*** 0.1105*** 0.0934*** 0.0907*** 0.0631***
(0.0359) (0.0209) (0.0090) (0.0098) (0.0162)
University degree father -0.0861 -0.0296 -0.0016 0.0293 0.0856**
(0.0648) (0.0238) (0.0130) (0.0332) (0.0345)
University degree mother 0.0997*** 0.0341** 0.0238 0.0101 -0.0250
(0.0206) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0247) (0.0321)
Metropolitan area -0.0542*** -0.0078 0.0086 0.0066 0.0115
(0.0178) (0.0123) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0199)
North 0.2520*** 0.1337*** 0.0693*** 0.0549*** 0.0376***
(0.0299) (0.0148) (0.0061) (0.0101) (0.0132)
Centre 0.2236*** 0.1225*** 0.0593*** 0.0451*** 0.0406***
(0.0354) (0.0201) (0.0090) (0.0055) (0.0128)
Constant 0.5096*** 1.0081*** 1.2461*** 1.4264*** 1.5096***
(0.0891) (0.0612) (0.0312) (0.0433) (0.0420)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A8: Quantile Regression of Wage for Males in Public Sector. Specication D
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0118*** 0.0126*** 0.0122*** 0.0180*** 0.0251***
(0.0039) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0031)
Experience 0.0356*** 0.0274*** 0.0259*** 0.0270*** 0.0267***
(0.0046) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0021)
Experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture -0.0372 -0.0510 -0.1082 -0.0548 -0.0602
(0.0583) (0.0713) (0.0704) (0.1229) (0.0604)
Manufacturing 0.0463 0.0482 0.0111 -0.0771** -0.0833
(0.0799) (0.0413) (0.0249) (0.0386) (0.1464)
Energy 0.0408 0.0349 -0.0284 -0.0347 -0.1340***
(0.0747) (0.0288) (0.0273) (0.0334) (0.0339)
Construction -0.0611 0.0730 0.0287 0.0131 -0.0203
(0.0975) (0.0523) (0.0431) (0.0876) (0.0512)
Retail -0.0726 -0.0506 -0.0895*** -0.1487*** -0.2026***
(0.1131) (0.0581) (0.0339) (0.0395) (0.0319)
Tourism -0.0387 0.0052 -0.0492 -0.0198 -0.1178
(0.0882) (0.0596) (0.0431) (0.0730) (0.1389)
Transport -0.0254 0.0551*** 0.0113 0.0533* -0.0003
(0.0518) (0.0164) (0.0217) (0.0312) (0.0256)
Finance -0.0683* -0.0024 -0.0447** -0.0148 -0.0295
(0.0399) (0.0252) (0.0184) (0.0397) (0.1303)
Health -0.0364 -0.0365** -0.0747*** -0.1033*** -0.1391***
(0.0351) (0.0148) (0.0216) (0.0234) (0.0301)
Telecommunication -0.0515 -0.0212 0.0092 0.0350 -0.0139
(0.0467) (0.0295) (0.0205) (0.0230) (0.0328)
Government Administration -0.0213 -0.0108 -0.0400*** -0.0591*** -0.0719***
(0.0166) (0.0070) (0.0140) (0.0192) (0.0272)
Education -0.0236 -0.0112 -0.0357** -0.0263 -0.0587***
(0.0220) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0158)
AdminServices -0.0190 0.0205 0.0369 0.0528* -0.0160
(0.0349) (0.0161) (0.0306) (0.0272) (0.0310)
Permanent Contract 0.0550* 0.0066 0.0400 0.0274 0.0156
(0.0323) (0.0203) (0.0283) (0.0249) (0.0276)
Big rm 0.0092 -0.0033 0.0211 0.0094 -0.0014
(0.0362) (0.0247) (0.0296) (0.0323) (0.0389)
Manager 0.0250*** 0.0783*** 0.1396*** 0.2126*** 0.2584***
(0.0085) (0.0118) (0.0156) (0.0251) (0.0296)
Intermediate Profession 0.0110 0.0529*** 0.0594*** 0.0552*** 0.0485***
(0.0185) (0.0134) (0.0087) (0.0109) (0.0080)
Married 0.0387 0.0267* 0.0278** 0.0272* 0.0202
(0.0267) (0.0158) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0254)
Kids 0.0333 0.0208 0.0140 0.0323** 0.0111
(0.0254) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0133) (0.0224)
Kids 10 0.0504* 0.0514*** 0.0789*** 0.0539*** 0.0340**
(0.0264) (0.0184) (0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0153)
University Performance 0.0004 0.0006*** 0.0014*** 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Knowledge of English 0.0256* 0.0187** 0.0233 0.0360*** 0.0523***
(0.0136) (0.0083) (0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0149)
Computer skill 0.0318* 0.0730*** 0.0903*** 0.0673*** 0.0724***
(0.0162) (0.0083) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0198)
University degree father 0.0595 0.0268* 0.0348*** -0.0308 -0.0397
(0.0428) (0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0193) (0.0426)
University degree mother -0.0339 -0.0407 -0.0485 0.0128 0.0369
(0.0441) (0.0388) (0.0397) (0.0367) (0.0451)
Metropolitan area -0.0116 -0.0084 -0.0196* -0.0286*** -0.0062
(0.0174) (0.0076) (0.0101) (0.0092) (0.0139)
North -0.0093 -0.0063 -0.0043 0.0046 0.0294
(0.0119) (0.0106) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0214)
Centre 0.0187*** -0.0051 0.0036 0.0387** 0.0842***
(0.0068) (0.0094) (0.0117) (0.0159) (0.0218)
Constant 1.1322*** 1.3228*** 1.4399*** 1.4944*** 1.5631***
(0.0898) (0.0504) (0.0558) (0.0533) (0.0425)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A9: Quantile Regression of Wage for Females in Public Sector. Specication D.
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0193*** 0.0158*** 0.0168*** 0.0149*** 0.0177***
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0047)
Experience 0.0296*** 0.0214*** 0.0138*** 0.0148*** 0.0211***
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Experience2 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture -0.1228 -0.0815** -0.1043** -0.1671 0.0635
(0.1233) (0.0383) (0.0413) (0.1645) (0.1801)
Manufacturing -0.1091 -0.1793* -0.1187* -0.0521 -0.1520
(0.2684) (0.1008) (0.0635) (0.0804) (0.1126)
Energy -0.0484 0.0065 -0.0296 -0.0408 0.0858
(0.1197) (0.0981) (0.0304) (0.0460) (0.1386)
Construction 0.0748 -0.0211 -0.1162** -0.1325* -0.1923***
(0.0981) (0.0322) (0.0531) (0.0784) (0.0472)
Retail -0.3275** -0.1433 -0.1111*** -0.1005* -0.0600
(0.1414) (0.0892) (0.0355) (0.0595) (0.0692)
Tourism 0.0454 -0.0224 -0.0572 -0.0525 -0.0037
(0.1061) (0.0544) (0.0834) (0.0470) (0.0756)
Transport -0.0261 -0.0565** -0.0277 0.0221 0.0340
(0.0975) (0.0249) (0.0636) (0.0430) (0.0669)
Finance -0.0176 -0.0241 -0.0290* -0.0610*** -0.0234
(0.0235) (0.0182) (0.0154) (0.0185) (0.0386)
Health -0.0551* -0.0371** -0.0246 -0.0411*** -0.0349
(0.0319) (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0153) (0.0215)
Telecommunication -0.0015 -0.0184 0.0236 0.0254 -0.0201
(0.0400) (0.0414) (0.0253) (0.0207) (0.0206)
Government Administration -0.0188 -0.0118 -0.0060 -0.0290 -0.0461
(0.0222) (0.0140) (0.0127) (0.0180) (0.0314)
Education -0.0153 -0.0193* 0.0060 -0.0095 0.0109
(0.0285) (0.0110) (0.0173) (0.0126) (0.0233)
AdminServices 0.0127 0.0206 0.0403*** 0.0204 0.0369
(0.0253) (0.0128) (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0230)
Permanent Contract -0.0026 -0.0095 -0.0019 -0.0107 -0.0042
(0.0356) (0.0189) (0.0167) (0.0078) (0.0221)
Big rm 0.0395 0.0119 0.0244 0.0405*** 0.0862***
(0.0440) (0.0278) (0.0204) (0.0129) (0.0210)
Manager 0.0124 0.0521*** 0.0835*** 0.1552*** 0.2542***
(0.0210) (0.0157) (0.0161) (0.0151) (0.0386)
Intermediate Profession 0.0238** 0.0442*** 0.0530*** 0.0535*** 0.0420**
(0.0119) (0.0076) (0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0184)
Married 0.0231** 0.0256** 0.0181** 0.0297*** 0.0212
(0.0113) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0143)
Kids -0.0014 0.0014 0.0071 0.0013 0.0196
(0.0128) (0.0078) (0.0115) (0.0084) (0.0168)
Kids 10 0.0334 0.0202 0.0080 0.0062 -0.0054
(0.0237) (0.0172) (0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0176)
University Performance 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0011*** 0.0015***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Knowledge of English -0.0287 -0.0123 -0.0079 0.0038 -0.0091
(0.0268) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0123) (0.0109)
Computer skill 0.0345*** 0.0305* 0.0210 0.0382*** 0.0273
(0.0131) (0.0174) (0.0129) (0.0098) (0.0271)
University degree father -0.0273 -0.0030 0.0244 0.0925*** 0.1164**
(0.0177) (0.0217) (0.0154) (0.0188) (0.0451)
University degree mother -0.0237 -0.0189 -0.0065 -0.0162 0.0064
(0.0564) (0.0264) (0.0154) (0.0300) (0.0355)
Metropolitan area -0.0098 -0.0056 -0.0109** -0.0195** -0.0134
(0.0187) (0.0089) (0.0050) (0.0076) (0.0116)
North 0.0167 -0.0056 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0079
(0.0264) (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0068) (0.0158)
Centre 0.0030 -0.0083 -0.0062 0.0055 0.0228
(0.0187) (0.0115) (0.0072) (0.0094) (0.0154)
Constant 1.1157*** 1.3961*** 1.5493*** 1.6540*** 1.6431***
(0.0999) (0.0481) (0.0474) (0.0352) (0.0614)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A10: Fixed Eects Quantile Regression of Wage for Males in Private Sector. Specication
D
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0049** 0.0061** 0.0056*** 0.0053*** 0.0029
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0038)
Experience 0.0311*** 0.0247*** 0.0224*** 0.0204*** 0.0172***
(0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0032)
Experience2 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture -0.0765 -0.0854 -0.0644*** -0.0846*** -0.1066
(0.0577) (0.0607) (0.0215) (0.0319) (0.0727)
Manufacturing -0.0174 -0.0282 -0.0008 -0.0032 0.0381
(0.0393) (0.0204) (0.0083) (0.0133) (0.0332)
Energy 0.0807*** 0.0367*** 0.0474*** 0.0551*** 0.0752**
(0.0234) (0.0088) (0.0119) (0.0183) (0.0349)
Construction 0.0034 -0.0331* 0.0042 -0.0049 0.0450
(0.0462) (0.0196) (0.0060) (0.0194) (0.0531)
Retail -0.0141 -0.0135 0.0103 0.0130 0.0262
(0.0355) (0.0151) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0194)
Tourism -0.0338 -0.0074 0.0003 0.0085 0.0395
(0.0386) (0.0216) (0.0124) (0.0212) (0.0316)
Transport -0.0317 -0.0105 0.0097 0.0016 0.0137
(0.0363) (0.0139) (0.0090) (0.0123) (0.0311)
Finance -0.0040 -0.0036 0.0201 0.0218* 0.0246
(0.0393) (0.0142) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.0272)
Health 0.0082 0.0010 0.0109 0.0118 0.0095
(0.0448) (0.0195) (0.0173) (0.0220) (0.0566)
Telecommunication 0.0060 0.0160 0.0359*** 0.0220** 0.0407*
(0.0388) (0.0163) (0.0083) (0.0108) (0.0225)
Government Administration -0.0047 -0.0032 0.0050 -0.0153 -0.0003
(0.0443) (0.0160) (0.0104) (0.0242) (0.0243)
Education 0.0532 0.0661*** 0.0694*** 0.0631** 0.0778*
(0.0404) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0273) (0.0420)
AdminServices -0.0205 -0.0110 0.0050 -0.0174 0.0341
(0.0348) (0.0238) (0.0118) (0.0185) (0.0595)
Permanent Contract -0.0416 -0.0027 0.0086 -0.0011 -0.0313
(0.0296) (0.0127) (0.0071) (0.0140) (0.0261)
Big rm 0.0239** 0.0242*** 0.0278*** 0.0336*** 0.0291
(0.0100) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0094) (0.0244)
Manager -0.0698** -0.0053 0.0066 0.0241** 0.0709**
(0.0306) (0.0119) (0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0283)
Intermediate Profession 0.0125 0.0292*** 0.0329*** 0.0428*** 0.0558***
(0.0130) (0.0088) (0.0053) (0.0074) (0.0092)
Married 0.0298* 0.0458*** 0.0526*** 0.0591*** 0.0740***
(0.0159) (0.0111) (0.0068) (0.0119) (0.0112)
Kids -0.0307 -0.0251*** -0.0236*** -0.0315*** -0.0351***
(0.0211) (0.0093) (0.0049) (0.0099) (0.0106)
Kids 10 -0.0534*** -0.0582*** -0.0491*** -0.0595*** -0.0981***
(0.0192) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0119) (0.0229)
University Performance 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0011*** 0.0014***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Knowledge of English 0.0521*** 0.0483*** 0.0472*** 0.0472*** 0.0488***
(0.0136) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0078) (0.0148)
Computer skill -0.0195 0.0082 -0.0068 -0.0161* -0.0311
(0.0216) (0.0098) (0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0416)
University degree father -0.0004 -0.0488*** -0.0525*** -0.0565*** -0.0649***
(0.0433) (0.0156) (0.0103) (0.0094) (0.0183)
University degree mother 0.2217*** 0.3180*** 0.3109*** 0.3059*** 0.3781***
(0.0507) (0.0170) (0.0130) (0.0321) (0.0664)
Metropolitan area -0.0154* 0.0025 -0.0083** -0.0166** -0.0002
(0.0086) (0.0077) (0.0035) (0.0075) (0.0159)
North 0.3527*** 0.3497*** 0.3461*** 0.3432*** 0.3493***
(0.0144) (0.0103) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0236)
Centre 0.2772*** 0.2890*** 0.2808*** 0.2796*** 0.2775***
(0.0268) (0.0120) (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0286)
Constant 1.2965*** 1.3236*** 1.4078*** 1.5219*** 1.6944***
(0.0382) (0.0335) (0.0199) (0.0385) (0.0793)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A11: Fixed Eects Quantile Regression of Wage for Females in Private Sector. Specica-
tion D.
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0022 0.0063** 0.0052*** 0.0062*** 0.0082***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Experience 0.0144*** 0.0187*** 0.0170*** 0.0159*** 0.0162***
(0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0034)
Experience2 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture 0.0890** 0.0143 0.0219 0.0079 -0.0811***
(0.0435) (0.0212) (0.0370) (0.0224) (0.0267)
Manufacturing -0.0406 -0.0445*** -0.0374*** -0.0465*** -0.0729***
(0.0306) (0.0168) (0.0123) (0.0152) (0.0168)
Energy -0.0414 -0.0510*** -0.0541*** -0.0536*** -0.0316
(0.0409) (0.0140) (0.0151) (0.0137) (0.0286)
Construction -0.0289 -0.0223 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0209
(0.0468) (0.0293) (0.0325) (0.0397) (0.0300)
Retail -0.0564* -0.0515*** -0.0466*** -0.0472*** -0.0658***
(0.0308) (0.0156) (0.0106) (0.0169) (0.0195)
Tourism -0.0680** -0.0318* -0.0260** -0.0124 -0.0065
(0.0296) (0.0188) (0.0117) (0.0219) (0.0416)
Transport -0.0356 -0.0477*** -0.0505*** -0.0666*** -0.0831***
(0.0383) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0101) (0.0261)
Finance 0.0201 0.0112 0.0116 0.0138 0.0347
(0.0226) (0.0142) (0.0087) (0.0204) (0.0266)
Health 0.0226 0.0218 0.0238* 0.0219** 0.0188
(0.0402) (0.0187) (0.0129) (0.0103) (0.0257)
Telecommunication 0.0322 0.0246 0.0138 -0.0062 -0.0060
(0.0417) (0.0188) (0.0113) (0.0186) (0.0131)
Government Administration -0.0047 -0.0218 -0.0243** -0.0254 -0.0113
(0.0380) (0.0189) (0.0116) (0.0220) (0.0271)
Education 0.0276 0.0346* 0.0161 0.0105 -0.0176
(0.0275) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0195)
AdminServices 0.0196 0.0138 0.0080 -0.0024 -0.0136
(0.0307) (0.0167) (0.0067) (0.0156) (0.0202)
Permanent Contract -0.0190* -0.0117 -0.0101 -0.0178** -0.0285*
(0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0152)
Big rm 0.0335*** 0.0262*** 0.0236*** 0.0215*** 0.0115
(0.0111) (0.0071) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0091)
Manager 0.0317 0.0254*** 0.0460*** 0.0662*** 0.0584**
(0.0294) (0.0082) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0264)
Intermediate Profession 0.0385* 0.0341*** 0.0335*** 0.0325*** 0.0477**
(0.0212) (0.0094) (0.0069) (0.0097) (0.0186)
Married 0.0421*** 0.0308*** 0.0337*** 0.0334*** 0.0300***
(0.0158) (0.0063) (0.0040) (0.0080) (0.0111)
Kids -0.0173 -0.0192*** -0.0036 0.0145** 0.0075
(0.0154) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0070) (0.0082)
Kids 10 0.0589*** 0.0678*** 0.0498*** 0.0418*** 0.0669***
(0.0198) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0109) (0.0207)
University Performance 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Knowledge of English 0.0120 0.0148** 0.0185*** 0.0250*** 0.0337***
(0.0138) (0.0061) (0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0102)
Computer skill 0.0513*** 0.0314** 0.0311*** 0.0198* 0.0349*
(0.0189) (0.0126) (0.0076) (0.0109) (0.0182)
University degree father 0.0278 0.0754*** 0.0789*** 0.0991** 0.1361***
(0.0477) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0412) (0.0313)
University degree mother 0.0247 0.0121 -0.0021 -0.0310* -0.0056
(0.0387) (0.0107) (0.0097) (0.0167) (0.0360)
Metropolitan area -0.0009 0.0058 0.0146*** 0.0148** 0.0178
(0.0095) (0.0065) (0.0029) (0.0065) (0.0138)
North -0.0235 -0.0591*** -0.0625*** -0.0687*** -0.0956***
(0.0146) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0103) (0.0205)
Centre 0.1835*** 0.1600*** 0.1562*** 0.1545*** 0.1419***
(0.0195) (0.0120) (0.0095) (0.0099) (0.0208)
Constant 1.6102*** 1.6234*** 1.7123*** 1.7640*** 1.8584***
(0.0647) (0.0309) (0.0181) (0.0283) (0.0315)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A12: Fixed Eects Quantile Regression of Wage for Males in Public Sector. Specication
D
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0123*** 0.0046*** 0.0025*** 0.0018 0.0010
(0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0044)
Experience 0.0303*** 0.0289*** 0.0273*** 0.0271*** 0.0292***
(0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0030)
Experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture 0.0964** 0.0764* 0.0244* -0.0185 -0.0555
(0.0488) (0.0458) (0.0142) (0.0118) (0.0521)
Manufacturing 0.2143*** 0.2038*** 0.1812*** 0.1117 0.2435**
(0.0440) (0.0356) (0.0129) (0.0828) (0.1151)
Energy 0.0323 0.0222 -0.0014 -0.0253 -0.0066
(0.0299) (0.0200) (0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0445)
Construction 0.0092 -0.0540 -0.0334 0.0206 -0.0261
(0.0685) (0.0775) (0.0966) (0.1491) (0.1559)
Retail 0.1099 0.0071 0.0513 0.0161 -0.0318
(0.1387) (0.0411) (0.0477) (0.0190) (0.0431)
Tourism -0.3593** -0.1433*** -0.1561*** -0.2078*** -0.2285***
(0.1739) (0.0360) (0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0453)
Transport 0.0167 0.0107 0.0057 -0.0042 0.0257
(0.0172) (0.0108) (0.0117) (0.0175) (0.0230)
Finance -0.0437 -0.0502** -0.0645** -0.0630*** -0.0701***
(0.0958) (0.0216) (0.0260) (0.0212) (0.0256)
Health -0.0161 -0.0268 -0.0179** -0.0355*** -0.0427
(0.0323) (0.0184) (0.0072) (0.0123) (0.0314)
Telecommunication 0.0319 -0.0189 0.0134 -0.0018 -0.0011
(0.0319) (0.0252) (0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0381)
Government Administration 0.0184 0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0101 0.0051
(0.0291) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0223)
Education -0.0106 -0.0162* -0.0157** -0.0210* -0.0192
(0.0338) (0.0085) (0.0068) (0.0119) (0.0139)
AdminServices 0.0815*** 0.0523*** 0.0549*** 0.0648*** 0.0695*
(0.0290) (0.0143) (0.0149) (0.0242) (0.0381)
Permanent Contract -0.0140 -0.0443*** -0.0255** -0.0570*** -0.0473*
(0.0408) (0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0166) (0.0246)
Big rm -0.0705* -0.0841*** -0.0741*** -0.0909*** -0.0922***
(0.0401) (0.0199) (0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0250)
Manager -0.0298** 0.0035 0.0058 0.0434*** 0.0400**
(0.0146) (0.0071) (0.0056) (0.0095) (0.0183)
Intermediate Profession -0.0187 -0.0174** -0.0128*** -0.0062 -0.0086
(0.0174) (0.0084) (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0111)
Married -0.0305 -0.0205** -0.0189*** -0.0107 -0.0309
(0.0256) (0.0088) (0.0055) (0.0118) (0.0203)
Kids 0.0674*** 0.0669*** 0.0759*** 0.0841*** 0.1047***
(0.0253) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0172)
Kids 10 -0.0297 -0.0050 0.0008 0.0076 0.0188
(0.0314) (0.0090) (0.0062) (0.0108) (0.0286)
University Performance 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.0022***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Knowledge of English 0.0069 -0.0065 0.0091* -0.0080 -0.0036
(0.0142) (0.0086) (0.0048) (0.0112) (0.0123)
Computer skill 0.0653*** 0.0698*** 0.0673*** 0.0740*** 0.0868***
(0.0133) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0113) (0.0238)
University degree father -0.1305*** -0.1053*** -0.0860*** -0.0456* -0.0515
(0.0257) (0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0236) (0.0317)
University degree mother 0.2658*** 0.2866*** 0.2975*** 0.3053*** 0.3011***
(0.0899) (0.0295) (0.0346) (0.0383) (0.0359)
Metropolitan area 0.0750*** 0.0686*** 0.0675*** 0.0616*** 0.0452***
(0.0130) (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0084) (0.0142)
North -0.0581*** -0.0457*** -0.0522*** -0.0514*** -0.0505***
(0.0168) (0.0090) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0121)
Centre 0.1924*** 0.2065*** 0.2055*** 0.2038*** 0.2003***
(0.0134) (0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0067) (0.0203)
Constant 1.7985*** 1.8076*** 1.8383*** 1.8979*** 1.8989***
(0.0749) (0.0358) (0.0215) (0.0299) (0.0476)
Time eects X X X X X
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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Table A13: Fixed Eects Quantile Regression of Wage for Females in Public Sector. Specication
D
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Schooling 0.0073* 0.0070*** 0.0049*** 0.0041*** -0.0028
(0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0025)
Experience 0.0057*** 0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0070*** 0.0103***
(0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0024)
Experience2 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Agriculture -0.0040 -0.0881*** -0.1111*** -0.1190*** -0.1366***
(0.0487) (0.0234) (0.0283) (0.0374) (0.0322)
Manufacturing -0.1456** -0.0786 -0.0891 -0.0621 0.0713
(0.0574) (0.0693) (0.0791) (0.1013) (0.1294)
Energy -0.0031 -0.0517*** -0.0942*** -0.0350 0.0302
(0.0156) (0.0102) (0.0342) (0.0929) (0.0832)
Construction 0.0900*** -0.0130 -0.0038 0.0399 -0.0168
(0.0275) (0.0210) (0.0589) (0.0779) (0.0646)
Retail -0.1094 -0.1314*** -0.1289*** -0.1361*** -0.0977**
(0.0668) (0.0351) (0.0219) (0.0327) (0.0443)
Tourism -0.0166 0.0727 0.0631** 0.0521 0.3260**
(0.0780) (0.0494) (0.0320) (0.1589) (0.1425)
Transport 0.0111 -0.0292 -0.0242 -0.0097 -0.0468
(0.0386) (0.0342) (0.0231) (0.0285) (0.0873)
Finance -0.1530*** -0.1102** -0.0667*** -0.0707** -0.0737*
(0.0567) (0.0460) (0.0115) (0.0341) (0.0379)
Health -0.0486*** -0.0370*** -0.0181*** -0.0281** -0.0276
(0.0154) (0.0082) (0.0056) (0.0142) (0.0232)
Telecommunication -0.0127 0.0435** 0.0881*** 0.0776 0.3267*
(0.0407) (0.0201) (0.0184) (0.0533) (0.1926)
Government Administration -0.0165 -0.0114 0.0019 -0.0065 0.0002
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0072) (0.0113) (0.0208)
Education -0.0225 -0.0180** -0.0082 -0.0028 0.0147
(0.0173) (0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0167) (0.0174)
AdminServices -0.0340 -0.0425*** -0.0282*** -0.0292* -0.0186
(0.0243) (0.0157) (0.0069) (0.0152) (0.0398)
Permanent Contract -0.0627*** -0.0276** -0.0175** -0.0152 -0.0263
(0.0217) (0.0125) (0.0083) (0.0136) (0.0203)
Big rm -0.0638*** -0.0259* -0.0250*** -0.0257** -0.0506***
(0.0220) (0.0132) (0.0080) (0.0111) (0.0190)
Manager -0.0129 0.0086* 0.0172*** 0.0261** 0.0389**
(0.0178) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0105) (0.0163)
Intermediate Profession -0.0415** -0.0176*** -0.0229** -0.0144 -0.0273**
(0.0200) (0.0065) (0.0089) (0.0097) (0.0132)
Married -0.0205* -0.0214*** -0.0227*** -0.0226*** -0.0267***
(0.0117) (0.0078) (0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0093)
Kids 0.0065 0.0034 0.0058 0.0140*** 0.0120
(0.0088) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0039) (0.0113)
Kids 10 -0.0151 -0.0205* -0.0229*** -0.0331*** -0.0296
(0.0180) (0.0119) (0.0041) (0.0064) (0.0181)
University Performance 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Knowledge of English 0.0126 0.0272*** 0.0414*** 0.0572*** 0.0840***
(0.0107) (0.0061) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0187)
Computer skill 0.0657*** 0.0644*** 0.0682*** 0.0780*** 0.1034***
(0.0118) (0.0092) (0.0050) (0.0077) (0.0162)
University degree father -0.0104 -0.0028 -0.0124* -0.0182** -0.0230
(0.0391) (0.0097) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0455)
University degree mother 0.2257*** 0.2369*** 0.2227*** 0.2218*** 0.2995***
(0.0623) (0.0132) (0.0157) (0.0289) (0.1051)
Metropolitan area -0.0673*** -0.0571*** -0.0593*** -0.0567*** -0.0617***
(0.0101) (0.0062) (0.0037) (0.0083) (0.0144)
North 0.0292*** 0.0174*** 0.0252*** 0.0225*** 0.0206*
(0.0110) (0.0065) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0110)
Centre 0.0302** 0.0297*** 0.0376*** 0.0368*** 0.0468***
(0.0146) (0.0080) (0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0095)
Constant 2.1414*** 2.1429*** 2.1391*** 2.1708*** 2.2348***
(0.0581) (0.0344) (0.0236) (0.0333) (0.0426)
Bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis (800 replications). ***: signicant at .99 level; **: signicant at .95 level; *: signicant at .90 level
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